Implications of rational choice theory in judges' decisions

Document Type : Scientific research

Authors

zahra sakiani ¹

mojtaba ghasemi ²

¹ faculty of law and political science, Tehran university, Tehran, Iran

² Assistant Professor of Law and Economics, Faculty of Law, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran

https://doi.org/10.22067/economlaw.2023.76637.1180

Abstract

A set of factors that affect Judicial behavior have been studied from the perspective of various sciences such as economics. Economics offers a specific way of delving into different subjects. Regarding the concepts of rational choice theory in economics such as its definitional meaning (making proportional tools and goals), maximizing expected utility, and maximizing wealth, this paper seeks to show what factors can influence judicial decisions and behaviors. It seems that recognizing the factors influencing the behavior of judges by policymakers and paying attention to them in policy-making can increasingly affect the quality and quantity of verdicts reached by judges and can lead to better allocation of financial resources in the judiciary system. The finding results based on library resources and descriptive-analytical methods show that hiring more judges to increase court outputs is not always an optimal solution. Even in some cases, an increase in judges' productivity allowances can provide enough external incentive to improve the quality and quantity of their verdicts.
 

Keywords

rational choice

judicial behavior

judicial productivity

maximization

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©2023 The author(s). This is an open access article distributed under Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0)

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