Economic Interpretation of Subsidiary Units Natur and Efficient Access to the Parent Company ( Comparative Study in United States, England and Iran )

Document Type : Scientific research

Author

• mehdi haghighatjoo

Assistant Professor, Department of Law, Islamic Azad University of Rasht, Rasht, Iran

https://doi.org/10.22067/economlaw.2024.83094.1286

Abstract

The pursuit of subsidiaries in a manner that is obtained through direct orders from the parent company necessitates the pursuit of the parent company. Direct access to the parent company and its pursuit should be considered an essential necessity. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to overlook the identity of the subsidiary cmpany with an economic approach.
Access to the parent company should not lead to a decline in market capacity. Pursuing the parent company as a result of overlooking the independent identities of the subsidiary companies will reduce the existing capacities in that market. Therefore, access to the parent company must be carried out in such a way that, while accepting the identity of the subsidiary companies, no harm is done to the productivity indices of the market.
An economic approach requires that bypassing the subsidiary companies and accessing the parent company should not be called an exception to the Principle of Contractual Relativity. Emphasis on Utility Indices requires that, in pursuing the parent company, the basis for accessing it is summarized by the intrinsic will of the subsidiary companies.

Keywords

• Behavioral Dependence
• Structural Independence
• Abuse of Structure
• Economic Access

References

•  

  • Joneidi, Laya (2015), Directors Liability under the Doctrine of Piercing Corporate Veil,Comparative Law Review, vol 6 , pp.85-105.
  • Rezaee, Ali, The Liability of a Mother Company Towards its Subsidiary, Comparative Law Review, vol8, pp.151-177.
  • Tehrany, Sotude. (1990) Commercial Law, Tehran, Dadgostar.
  • Shahbazinia, Morteza (2017), Piercing Corporate Veil with the Assumption of Fraud of Partner in Iran and Englands‌ Law, Tehran, the Judiciary Law Journal, vol.74. pp.9-39.
  • Bill, Snow. (2011) Merger and Acquisitions, New York, Wiley Publishing.
  • Bael, Van; (2005) Competition Law of the European Community, Neatherlands, Kluwer Law.
  • Brian, Coyle. (2000) Merger and Acquisitions, Chicago, Glenelake Publishing Company.
  • Cassimon, Bruno. (2006). Merger and Acquisitions, Northampton, Edward Elgar.
  • Cynthia, Daywallace. (2002) The Multinational Enterprise and Legal Control, New York, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
  • Dana, Gold. (2009) Law and Economics, London, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
  • Donald, Langevoort, (2011), the Behavioral Economics of Mergers and Acquisitions, Research Paper, Economics and Regulatory Law, Paper No, 10-17. Available at GeorgetownUniversityLaw.Scholarship.com last visited at: 2017/1/23.
  • Dlucas, Bergkamp et al. (2001). Piercing The Corporate Veil, vol.8/2, Maastricht, Journal of European and Comparitive Law.
  • Ernest, Young. (1994). Merger & Acquisition, New York, John Wiley & sons.
  • Fiona, Macmilla. (2000). International Corporate Law, Oxford, Hart Publishing.
  • Hawk, Barry. (2009). International Antitrust Law and Policy, New York, Juris Publishing.
  • Herman, Daems.(1978). The Holding Company and Corporate Contorol, Boston, Springer.
  • Hildebrandt International Firm, (2004). Anatomy of Law Firm Merger, Chicago, American Bar Association.
  • Hunter, Alex. (1966). Competition and The Law, London,Allen and Unwin.
  • Lee, Roach. (2016). Company Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
  • Ernest, Young. (1904). Merger and Acquisitions, Toronto, John Wiley.
  • Jonathan, Kalodimos et al, (2017). Shareholder Rights in Mergers and Acquisitions, Oregon University Research Paper. Available at https:// ssrn.com last visited at:2017/1/21.
  • Karen, Vandekerckove. (2007). Piercing the corporate veil, London, Kluwer Law international.
  • Katali, Judit Cseres. (2005). Competition Law and Consumer Protection, Hugue, Kluwer Law.
  • John, Fredweston. (2016). Mergers Restructuring and Corporate Contorol, New York, Business and Economics.
  • Jose Maria Lezcano. (2015). Piercing the corporate veil, New York, Routledge.
  • Loannis, Kokkoris (2011). Merger Control in Europe, London, Routledge.
  • Michala, Rudorfer (2009). Piercing the corporate veil, New York, Springer.
  • Michael, Commons. (2005). Acquisitions, London, Behaviorism.
  • Nancy, Hubbard. (1999). Acquisition Strategy and Implementation, New York, Purdue University Press.
  • Nussbaum, Andrew.(2012). Merger and Acquisitions, London, Thomson Routers.
  • Pual, Fischer. (2008). Fundamentals of Adranced Accounting, New York, Thomson South Western.
  • Ruth, Nielsen. (2011). Contract Law, Kobenhavn, Wolters Kluwer.
  • Richard, Markovits. (2012). Economic and Interpretation and Application of US and EU antitrust, Texas, Springer.
  • Robert, Bruner. (2004). Applied Mergers and Acquisitions, New Jersey, John Wiley and Son.
  • Weber, Yaakov. (2011). Research on Merger and Acquisitions, Northampton, Edward Elgar.
  • Xingyun, Peng. (2010). Financial Theory, Singapore, World Century.
  • Werner, Ray; (1967). Legal Developments in Marketing, Journal of Marketing, vol.31, No.2
  • Soebhaenullah Khan,Muhammad; (1992)Regulation and Control of Monopolies and Restrictive Trade, New Delhi, Practices, Royal Book co.
  • William, Lee; (2017), The Law of Public Communication, New York, Routledge.
  • Letwin, William; (1965). Law and Economic Policy in America, Chicago, the University of Chicago Press.