An analysis of the Constitutional Political Economy and Its Relation to Legal Discourse: Explaining the Distinction of Fundamental Concepts in the Framework of Interdisciplinary Studies

Document Type : Scientific research

Authors

• Amirhossein Bamati Tousi ¹
• Mostafa Mansourian ²
• Mohammad Barzegar Khosravi ³

¹ Master's student in public law, Department of Law, University of Judicial Sciences and Administrative Services, Tehran, Iran

² Assistant Professor, Department of Law, University of Judicial Sciences and Administrative Services, Tehran, Iran

³ Assistant Professor, Economic Law group, Parliament Research Center, Tehran, Iran

https://doi.org/10.22067/economlaw.2025.93339.1452

Abstract

Constitutional political economy is a theoretical and interdisciplinary approach that seeks to explain the nature and function of diverse and alternative legal models that have a fundamental place in the institutional order of societies. This epistemological domain, on the one hand, has a close and structural relationship with the knowledge of Constitutional law, and on the other hand, by utilizing the analytical tools and conceptual capacities of economics, it attempts to analyze the motivational mechanisms of institutions and provide a coherent and effective framework for designing and regulating the rules governing economic and political behavior. In this article, the fundamental concepts of this approach are examined, and its relationship with legal discourse is analyzed. This article, by adopting a descriptive-analytical approach, shows that this approach's understanding of concepts such as constitutional rule and constitution, despite the similarities it has with the legal reading, has fundamental differences in theoretical foundations. This paper represents a preliminary step toward a conceptual dialogue between these two theoretical frameworks.

Keywords

• Constitutional Political Economy
• Constitutional Economics
• economic analysis of constitution
• law and Economics

Main Subjects

• Economic Analysis of Law

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