Efficient Criteria for Identifying Dominant Position in Digital Platforms: A Comparative Study in the European Union

Document Type : Scientific research

Authors

• Mohsen Sadeghi ¹
• Parsa Jodeyri Eslami ²

¹ Associate Professor, Department of Private and Islamic Law, Faculty of Law and Political Sciences University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran.

² MA. In International Trade and Economic Law, Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran.

https://doi.org/10.22067/economlaw.2025.93883.1458

Abstract

Digital platforms, as key players in the modern economy, possess unique structural features such as network effects, the ability to provide services free of charge, and the capacity to aggregate and process big data. These characteristics pose significant challenges to the application of traditional competition law criteria for identifying a dominant market position. This research, employing a descriptive-analytical method, examines the difficulties of assessing market power and identifying dominance in the context of digital platforms from a competition law perspective. The central hypothesis of the study is that the classic criteria for assessing market power—namely market share, entry barriers, and countervailing user power—serve as a valid foundation from which more specific indicators, tailored to the unique nature of platforms, can be derived. The findings indicate that the “Document of Major Policies and Requirements for Supporting Competition and Countering Monopoly,” approved by the Supreme Council of Cyberspace, provides a legally supportable framework for the Iranian Competition Council to effectively apply these tailored criteria in practice.

Keywords

• Competition Council
• Dominant Position
• Market Power
• Network Effect

Main Subjects

• Competition Law

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